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I. Introduction
In the last decade or so, legal academia has witnessed a literal ex-
plosion of discourse of legal pluralism. Far from being an exception here, 
the fi eld of EU law is at the forefront.1 In this paper we will try to explain 
briefl y what the reasons for this are, and above all what legal plural-
ism, in its various forms, actually stands for. For this purpose, we will 
compare the so-called classical conceptions of legal pluralism on the one 
hand, and legal pluralism as it has emerged in the European Union on 
the other hand. It will be argued that the classical conceptions of legal 
pluralism fall short of explaining, and are conceptually different from, the 
legal pluralism that has been taking root within the EU. 
Having understood this difference, we will then focus more precisely 
- and this will constitute the core of the paper - on the European Union 
and the pluralist challenges that ensue from the uneasy and complex re-
lationships between the legal orders of the Member States and the supra-
national legal order. The core question in that regard is how to approach 
the challenges that EU legal pluralism in its various forms and degrees 
poses for the role that the law is expected to play in the European Union. 
It will be claimed that the two different responses to this question are: 
either by preserving EU legal pluralism or by thwarting it, namely, by 
conceptualising and developing the EU legal order as a coherent or as a 
uniform legal order. Finally, it will be argued that since each of these two 
models seems to presume a different image of the European Union, the 
choice between the two depends on which should better ensure certainty 
in the allocation of rights and duties that best fi ts the conception of jus-
tice prevailing in the EU.
 
* PhD Researcher, European University Institute, Florence. LL.M NYU School of Law. I 
would like to thank Neil Walker for the comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Com-
ments are welcome at <matej.avbelj@iue.it> and the usual disclaimer applies.
1 The literature is huge. In order to avoid repetition it will not be listed here, but it can be 
found in the footnotes that follow in the rest of this paper.
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II. The Many Faces of Legal Pluralism
a) Classical conceptions of legal pluralism 
Legal pluralism can be defi ned as a concept which refers to legal 
systems, networks or orders co-existing in the same geographical space.2 
Its origins can be traced back to the 1960s’ empirical studies of post-
colonial societies conducted by legal anthropologists who showed that 
in colonial and post-colonial societies a great deal of social and confl ict 
resolution took place under traditional norms and processes which were 
not offi cially recognised as law and which were sometimes even in confl ict 
with national or state law,3 usually termed as modern law and imposed 
by western colonial forces. The beginnings of legal pluralism were thus 
underlined by the critique of hegemonic ex-colonial forces and of their 
disregard and contempt for the indigenous law and for local traditions. 
This line of legal pluralism can be called a post-colonial account of legal 
pluralism. 
These studies were later extended to embrace modern societies 
where legal pluralism (state legal pluralism) was claimed to be concealed 
by a common ideology of unitary positive law. Different sociologists of 
law have pursued these claims further, contending that a systematic, 
homogeneous positive law, bound to a central legislator and jurisdiction, 
co-exists with habits that are collectively binding by way of the repeat-
ed practice of widespread recognition and whose importance lies within 
their potential to consolidate, transform or even alter positive law.4 Fur-
thermore, positive law is hence not the exclusive source of binding norms 
in a society, since an array of social actors has the authority to create 
collectively binding norms beyond the political process itself and beside 
the political legislator.5 These two accounts of legal pluralism (post-colo-
nial and modern statist) seem part of the conception of legal pluralism 
which is confi ned to the state and is characterised by its attack on the 
dogma according to which positive law enacted by the state is the only 
source of law. 
Subsequently, an even broader conception of legal pluralism was 
developed, according to which legal pluralism within the state is only a 
subspecies of legal pluralism. It was emphasised that the state is not the 
only source of normative and legal regulations and that individuals or 
2 W Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory (Butterworths, London, Edinburgh, Dublin 
2000) 83.
3 Ibid 84.
4 E Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie Des Rechts (Duncker und Humblot, Berlin 1989).
5 L Pospisil, Anthropology of Law - A Comparative Theory (Harper & Row, Publishers, New 
York 1971).
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other legal subjects now regularly fi nd themselves governed by a variety 
of regulatory orders which overlap, interact and often confl ict.6 Santos 
described these different intersecting legal spaces superimposed, inter-
penetrated and mixed in our mind and actions as interlegality.7 Accord-
ingly, this broader conception of legal pluralism led to recognition that 
local, national, transnational, regional and global orders could all apply 
to the same situation.8 It was convincingly shown that many law-creating 
activities also take place beyond and within the state - on the sub-state 
level, that is, on the local and regional level, and not just on the level of 
the state itself.  
However, this euphoric achievement of disengaging the law and the 
state which results in the hypertrophy of legal pluralisms calls for a great 
deal of caution. Whereas legal pluralism suggests a huge internal diver-
sity present in every society, whether a self-contained or an open one, 
which positive law tends to overlook or even suppress, legal pluralists 
generally overlook the importance of the positivity of law and the formal 
conditions that certain norms have to satisfy in order to count as law in 
the fi rst place. By designating statist positive law only as one of many 
semi-autonomous social fi elds9 - and even not the most important one in 
their eyes - legal pluralists achieve two things. First, and this has to be 
welcomed, they show that the creation of law is a dynamic process which 
encompasses all institutional layers of society, that is, both informal and 
normatively structured societal areas.10 They emphasise how the law as 
an institutional normative order cooperates but also confl icts with other 
normative orders in society. Nevertheless, the proponents of legal plural-
ism tend to neglect the conceptual problems that are raised by their ap-
proach. Thus, they often simply disregard the problems of when, where 
and how to draw distinctions between legal and non-legal phenomena and 
between legal orders, systems, traditions and cultures.11 It is very com-
mon for legal pluralist to see the law more or less everywhere: in families, 
at working places, in favelas, in the relations among global actors, for ex-
ample multinationals,12 and so forth. Therefore, classical legal pluralism, 
6 Twining (n 2) 84, citing J Vanderlinden, ‘Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later’ 
(1989) 28 Journal of Legal Pluralism 149, 154.
7 B de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Para-
digmatic Transition (Rutledge, New York 1995) 472-473.
8 Twining (n 2) 85.
9 S Falk Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appro-
priate Subject of Study’ (1972/1973) 7 Law and Society Review 720.
10 Ibid.
11 Twining (n 2) 85.
12 In the activities of these large multinational corporations, some scholars have even man-
aged to locate constitutional law (sic!). See, for example, HW Arthurs, ‘Constitutionalizing 
Neo-Conservatism and Regional Economic Integration: TINA x 2’ in TJ Courchene (ed), 
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in its internal to state and broader conception, despite its advantages in 
breaking the hegemonic understanding of law, remains largely vague and 
without a clear sense of direction.13 Ultimately, it leaves us, as Teubner’s 
reply to Santos clearly confi rms, in ambiguity and confusion.14 
Conceptually, methodologically and practically, this is an utterly 
disappointing result. The classical account of legal pluralism apparent-
ly does not live up to its challenges and instead of analysing, critically 
evaluating and simplifying the problems on which it is focused, it rather 
exacerbates them. But even if the discourse of legal pluralism managed 
to overcome these fundamental shortcomings, it should - at least in our 
eyes - achieve much more. It should be able not just to point to the di-
versities in modern societies and to the complexities that arise when they 
interact, but should provide a matrix within which the negative conse-
quences of legal pluralism could be tamed while at the same time the 
benefi ts of pluralism would be preserved.  
Finally, and above all, as we will see below, legal pluralism - due to 
its original micro-level anthropological orientation, from which it appar-
ently cannot be successfully severed - can hardly be of any epistemologi-
cal or explanatory help in understanding the legally pluralist nature of 
the European Union. This point has to be made clear in order to prevent 
further methodological misconceptions or naïve expectations about the 
potential constructive role of classical legal pluralism in research in the 
fi eld of European Union.
b) Legal Pluralism in the European Union
On the face of it, the European Union nicely fi ts the broad defi nition 
of legal pluralism, being inter alia defi ned as a concept which refers to 
legal systems co-existing in the same geographical space.15 Indeed, within 
the geographical space of the Member States of the European Union, 
there are (at least) two distinct legal orders,16 that of the respective Mem-
ber State and the supranational legal order of the EU. The legal order of 
the Member States has been historically conceived as a hierarchical sys-
Room to Manoeuvre? Globalization and Policy Convergence (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal and Kingston 1999) 17.
13 Twining (n 2) 228.
14 G Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1992) 13 Cardozo Law 
Review 1443.
15 Twining (n 2) 83.
16 And with the development of differentiated integration, there might even exist multi-
dimensional claims towards ultimate legal authority. For a more theoretical grounding of 
these issues, see N Walker, ‘Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European 
Union’ in Bankowski and Scott (eds), The European Union and its Order: The Legal Theory of 
European Integration (Blackwell, Oxford 1999) 32-33. 
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tem with a clear and single source of ultimate legal and political authority 
- popularly called sovereignty - grounded in a wider political democratic 
system which exists for, and is created by, the people.17 On the other 
hand, and this is a very well-known story, alongside the legal orders of 
the Member States, a supranational EU legal order was created by their 
common accord. This was in due course proclaimed as an autonomous 
legal order for which Member States have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit in limited fi elds,18 although of course they have not given up the 
autonomy of their own legal orders. The European legal reality is then 
one of the co-existence of autonomous legal orders, each of them claim-
ing ultimate legal authority19 expressed by the principle of the supremacy 
of EU law on the supranational side, and the invocation of sovereignty on 
the statist side.
It is precisely this existence of competing plausible claims to ultimate 
legal authority from two different sources - the states and the suprana-
tional EU - that distinguishes European legal pluralism from classical 
legal pluralism. The latter did not envisage this kind of situation and 
therefore, as intimated before, it falls short of explanatory power in the 
fi eld of the European legal order. However, in order to fully understand 
this distinction between the two conceptions of legal pluralism, it is nec-
essary to clarify the character and meaning of the term “plausible claim 
to ultimate legal authority”. 
The latter defi nes sovereignty in legal rather than in political terms, 
as a threshold concept (i.e. being a matter of degree), referring to the in-
ternal order of a polity rather than its external relations, and as divisible, 
yet requiring a fi nality of decision.20 It stems from the conceptual de-
construction of the concept of sovereignty achieved by the simultaneous 
severing of sovereignty from the state21 and by decoupling the political 
17 This nice, transparent, self-referential hierarchical structure of formal general rules pro-
duced certainty and consequential confi dence in the thus-conceived legal order. This has 
been so since the Peace of Westphalia. The concept of law as unity, with its faculty for pro-
viding certainty and confi dence, dates back to, and is a very reaction,to, the uncertainties 
and insecurities existing in Europe of that time. See SD Scott, Constitutional Law of the 
European Union (Pearson Education, Harlow 2002) 278.
18 Case C-26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 1.
19 The term was coined by N Walker. See Walker (n 16) 59 - 64.
20 Ibid.
21  One way of defi ning the sovereign state is to see it as a territorial political order coupled 
with the legally defi ned position of near-absolute legislative power. Externally, the state is 
sovereign if there are no external limits to its internal exercise of political and legal power. 
MacCormick claims that these kinds of states nowadays no longer exist and, furthermore, 
sovereignty is not the core concept. Law does not require a sovereign in order to be law, 
since it is the law which determines the sovereign. See N MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sover-
eign State’ (1993) 56(1) MLR 12. 
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and legal nature of sovereignty.22 Law and politics, despite the fact that 
they are mutually constitutive,23 are nevertheless two different concepts. 
Law is an institutional normative order characterised by the fundamental 
word “ought” as opposed to the word “is”, which belongs to the political 
world, i.e. to the world of power.24 This decoupling of the legal and politi-
cal nature of sovereignty enables us to overcome the historically enrooted 
“absolute” conception of sovereignty, according to which being sovereign 
means having absolute power which ends in the absolute obedience of 
individuals and agencies within the legal and political order of a particu-
lar state. The absolute conception of sovereignty is thus primarily con-
ceptually superfi cial and, as correctly pointed out, it is also sociologically 
naïve.25 Once politics as power and law as normativity are conceptually 
distinguished, we are immediately able to see social reality with different 
eyes, allowing us a more sophisticated, nuanced view transgressing the 
old-fashioned all-or-nothing approach. In other words, decoupling the 
legal and political nature of the concept of sovereignty is a prerequisite 
for conceiving and understanding legal pluralism as such, and a fortiori 
its EU version.  
Whilst for one part EU legal pluralism thus conforms to classical 
legal pluralism in its conviction that the state is not the only source of 
law (regulatory authority, etc), it nevertheless takes a completely different 
stance from that of classical legal pluralism. First of all, EU legal plural-
ism does not operate on the micro level by putting forward examples of 
numerous other private actors that in different informal, semi-formal and 
formal environments allegedly also create law. Rather, it works on the 
macro level by contending that there is another structure, i.e. a supra-
national legal order, which claims to be autonomous, on an equal footing 
with the state, or even trumping it by asserting equally plausible ultimate 
legal authority. In other words, while legal pluralism in classical terms 
points to the other sources and actors of norm creation, it is clear that 
these sources and actors do not think of themselves as autonomous enti-
ties that are equal to states or even something more than states. Even if 
we adopt the stand of classical legal pluralists according to whom differ-
ent non-state social structures, such as families and working and living 
communities also create law properly called, which, as we have stressed 
above, is in itself contestable and more or less implausible, we can cer-
tainly note that these social structures do not claim ultimate legal au-
thority. Even if they did claim it, these claims would be plausible neither 
22 Walker (n 16).
23 N Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 MLR 343
24 See N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignity: Law, State and Nation in the European Com-
monwealth (OUP, Oxford, New York 1999) 4.. 
25 Walker (n 16) 34.
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in an objective nor in a subjective sense.26 On the contrary, they, as the 
proponents of classical legal pluralism suggest, demand the recognition 
by this very state’s positive law which they want to reshape in order to 
make it more inclusive and more responsive to the whole range of diver-
sities and of different social-norm-creation-sources in society. This can 
also be neatly shown by the following examples.
It is completely implausible, for example, for a family, or to make it 
less bizarre, for a favela, to claim one day ultimate legal authority, i.e. 
the right to autonomy and self-governance separately from the state, by 
contending that its law is higher than the law of the state in which the 
favela is located. This would simply be considered as a riot and thus as 
a manifest breach of the law of the state. The same holds true for the 
so-called global networks, to which classical legal pluralism also points, 
such as NGOs, multinationals, etc. They do not claim ultimate legal au-
thority either, but they rather strive for recognition by the law of the state 
in which they are active, and they have to comply with this very law. 
Amnesty International, perhaps as the most notable example of a global 
NGO, has never claimed that “its law” trumps the law of a certain state 
(of course, it has many times claimed that the law of a particular state is 
contrary to the minimum standards of human rights protection under in-
ternational law, which is, however, a completely different kind of claim). 
A similar story relates to so-called global functional “guild” organisations 
such as sporting organisations. While their rules are granted a great deal 
of autonomy and the states do not in principle interfere with the setting 
of the rules of the game, the transactions of players and so on, this is 
only as long as their “autonomous rules” do not contravene some laws of 
the respective state. For example, if, for the violation of its autonomous 
rules, the Federal International Football Association (FIFA) or a national 
football association (the Slovenian association, for example)27 imposed a 
26 This distinction can be traced back to HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 
OUP, Oxford, New York 1994). Hart’s conception of law based on the rule of recognition 
as a source of criteria of the validity of the particular legal system distinguishes between 
the two indispensable sets of requirements - objective and subjective - for the existence of 
a legal system. The objective criterion is expressed in terms of the effectiveness of primary 
rules which is measured by the compliance (or obedience) of the individuals with them. 
Or in Hart’s words “[so] long as the laws which are valid by the system’s test of validity are 
obeyed by the bulk of the population this surely is all the evidence that we need that a given 
legal system exists.” The subjective criterion is fulfi lled on the level of secondary rules by the 
attitude of offi cials who have to create and comply with these rules because they perceive 
them as binding law, and not for whatever kind of reason in terms of compliance, as this 
is a case of obedience of “ordinary individuals” to the primary rules. Again, as Hart put it: 
the “[l]egal system’s rules of recognition and its rules of change and adjudication must be ef-
fectively accepted as common public standards of offi cial behavior by its offi cials”. 
27 A similar case arose before the Slovenian Constitutional Court (case U-I-51/94, at 
<http://www.us-rs.si> accessed 1 October 2006). It was, however, rejected on purely pro-
cedural grounds, yet it was emphasised later that the Court’s reasoning would go in the 
direction that we pointed to above. 
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huge fi ne on a football club which would imminently lead to its collapse, 
this would cause an infringement of the fundamental constitutional right 
of freedom of association. Consequently, the constitutional court would 
scrutinise the decision of FIFA for compliance with the national consti-
tution. If this FIFA decision was found to be disproportionate, thus con-
stituting an unjustifi ed interference with the constitutional right to as-
sociation, the constitutional court would certainly not hesitate to strike 
it down. There is no plausible way in which FIFA or a national football 
association could contend that its autonomous rules are above the state 
constitution and that the latter should therefore give way to it. Yet, in the 
European Union, precisely these kinds of claims emerge as a sign of legal 
pluralism. In the following section we examine how they have been dealt 
with and what types of responses there are to EU legal pluralism.
III. Types of Responses to EU legal pluralism
As we have seen, legal pluralism in the European Union is charac-
terised by the competing plausible claims to ultimate legal authority be-
tween the legal orders of the Member States and the supranational legal 
order. The relationship between these two sets of legal orders came to the 
centre of attention of the European scholarly and broader public after 
the adoption of the Single European Act and the subsequent creation of 
the European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht. This was the time when 
both exit and voice were lost,28 supranationalism started to bite, and the 
Member States, more accurately their highest courts, showed their teeth 
as well. The time has come when the actors in the national legal orders 
have realised that supranational polity has been successfully constitut-
ed, that it exists alongside the Member States, and that it penetrates 
them even on the most fundamental level, on the traditionally sacrosanct 
level, i.e. on the level of state constitutions that would, according to the 
EU principle of supremacy, need to give way to the tiniest supranational 
legal act in the event of confl ict. Then came the proverbial constitutional 
confl icts, admittedly very few, but nonetheless imposing, when most no-
tably the German but also the constitutional courts of the other Member 
States started to assert their own supremacy, their own remaining capac-
ity to police the boundaries and subsequent validity of the supranational 
legal order.29 Since the available space in this paper necessarily requires 
that we cut this long story short, we will just briefl y present the types of 
28 For a discussion of the interplay of the interplay of notions of voice and exit, see JHH 
Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100 YALE LJ 2403, 2401.
29 For the majority of cases, see A Oppenheimer (ed), The Relationship Between European 
Community Law and National Law: The Cases (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1994 and 2003) vol.1 and vol.2.. 
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responses to EU legal pluralism that have developed in reaction to the 
given constitutional confl icts. 
Among the debates between constitutional and international law 
scholars, we can identify two major approaches to the understanding of 
this relationship: the hierarchical and heterarchical approach. However, 
it is becoming increasingly diffi cult to draw the line between the two. 
Under the hierarchical approaches, whose leitmotif is to respond to 
the challenges of EU legal pluralism in a monist way, we can distinguish 
between the monist international law approach, the statist federal ap-
proach, and the pluralist approach under international law. According 
to the monist international law approach, the supranational legal order, 
EU as a polity, cannot plausibly claim ultimate legal authority, since its 
origin has to be traced back to the common international accord of the 
Member States which remain the ultimate arbiters of the validity of EU 
law.30 Pursuant to the federal approach, the EU is already, or it is at least 
certainly on the way to becoming, a fully-fl edged federation where EU law 
has its own foundations, where as the law of the land trumps the legal 
rules emanating from the legal orders of the Member States in the event 
of contravention.31 Both of these accounts are classical and well-known 
expressions of monism under international or federal state law. The last 
example of the hierarchical approach to the relationship between the le-
gal orders in the EU is much more nuanced and already draws heavily on 
the heterarchical approach. The best example of this is the approach en-
dorsed by MacCormick according to which the relationship between the 
legal orders of the Member States and the supranational EU legal order 
is one of heterarchy - mutual recognition of the autonomous existence of 
both systems, which are, however, in the good old Kelsenian tradition, 
subordinated to the overall rules and principles of international law that 
should provide a solution when the equally plausible claims to ultimate 
legal authority of both legal orders confl ict.32 
As opposed to the hierarchical approaches, the heterarchical ap-
proaches recognise for both supranational and national legal orders equal 
plausibility of their claims to ultimate legal authority within their respect-
ed fi elds. Both legal orders are considered as autonomous, with their own 
30 See, for example, T Schilling, ‘Who in Law is the Ultimate Umpire of European Commu-
nity Law?’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/96.
31 There are many examples of this account which is, however, quite diversifi ed. For a very 
prominent assertion in the direction of this approach, see J Fischer, ‘From Confederacy to 
Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of the European Integration’ (Speech given at Hum-
boldt University, Berlin, 12 May 2000). See also J Habermas, ‘Why Europe Needs a Consti-
tution?’ (2001) 11 New Left Review 5. 
32 See N MacCormick, ‘Juridical Pluralism and the Risk of Constitutional Confl ict’ in Mac-
Cormick (n 24). 
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full, exhaustive, defi nitive set of secondary rules.33 While autonomy can 
never be literally complete, since social systems cannot exist in splendid 
isolation from their environment,34 i.e. in this case from the other legal 
orders, and it is thus always a matter of degree, the degree of autonomy 
which should be recognised for the EU supranational legal order differs 
among authors according to how radical an account of legal pluralism 
they have adopted. Following the most radical account of EU legal plural-
ism, i.e. epistemic pluralism, most notably pursued by Walker, the EU 
supranational legal order and the legal orders of the Member States are 
recognised as different sites, each possessing its own epistemic starting 
point, i.e. its own way of knowing and understanding. Accordingly, this 
means that in the event of confl icts between the competing claims to 
ultimate legal authority there is no plausible perspective, no sure basis 
of historical knowledge, no Archimedean point, from which these claims 
could be reconciled, for as long as the EU legal order and the legal order 
of the Member States are treated as different unities.35
Other proponents of the heterarchical accounts, while recognising 
the autonomy of each respective legal order, fall short of epistemic plural-
ism and try to fi nd a plausible solution for the reconciliation of apparent-
ly irreconcilable claims. However, as a result, some of them tend to drift, 
volens nolens, back to the monistic - non-pluralist solution. An example 
of this is an attempt towards the creation of a set of legal principles that 
would best fi t into the practice of pluralist relationships between the na-
tional and supranational legal order and which would consequently ena-
ble the courts of last instance to fi nd an equilibrium between the compet-
ing confl icting claims. However, according to this approach, the last word 
in the case of the competing claims embodied in the so-called constitu-
tional confl icts goes to the national constitutional courts.36 Similarly, but 
in a broader context that transgresses the constitutional confl icts and the 
role of the courts of the last instance, it is claimed that a sort of harmony 
(contrapunct) between the competing legal orders should be achieved by 
the greater inclusion of various participants, ordinary courts, political ac-
tors, and individuals in the EU legal discourse.37 Finally, Weiler sees the 
33 See B Simma and D Pulkowski, ‘Leges Speciales and Self-Contained Regimes’ <http://www.
freewebs.com/create-future/Leges%20specialis%20and%20self-contained%20regimes.
PDF> accessed 18 Dec 2005.
34 Ibid 3. 
35 Walker (n 23) 338.
36 M Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Confl ict: Constitutional Supremacy in 
Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11(3) ELJ 299.
37 M P Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in N 
Walker (ed), Sovereignity in Transition (Hart, Oxford 2003).
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solution of the tense relationships between the competing supranational 
and national legal orders in the practice of so-called constitutional toler-
ance.38 This is an example of normative pluralism which is the expression 
of the ethics of political responsibility in Europe that should be founded 
on mutual recognition of and respect among the national and suprana-
tional authorities.39 
What all these accounts of EU legal pluralism have in common is the 
setting of the strategies of confl ict avoidance in order to maintain a sort 
of tranquillity or harmony in the relationship between the supranational 
and statist legal orders. However, in order to fully understand what these 
constitutional confl icts among the legal orders in the EU are really about 
and how the desired harmony could be achieved by legal means, if at all, 
it is necessary to focus on the nature and role of law in the era of the chal-
lenges posed by legal pluralism.
IV. Dual Nature of Law 
It has been submitted that globalisation and its phenomena, and 
perhaps most notably the emergence of the European Union, have chal-
lenged the traditional understanding of law, even to the degree that an 
entire shift of the paradigm of law is said to be required.40 However, while 
we generally share the beliefs of these paradigm-shifters, we are never-
theless convinced that despite the fundamental changes in the environ-
ment in which the law is embedded, the law still remains the cornerstone 
38 See JHH Weiler, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg’ in 
JHH Weiler and M Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2003).
39 The defi nition of normative pluralism is Walker’s, see Walker (n 23) 337.
40 For these kinds of claims within the context of the European Union, see, for example, 
N MacCormick (n 32):”…the interlocking of legal systems […] poses a profound challenge to 
our understanding of law and the legal system. The resources of theory need to be enhanced 
to deal with a challenge full of profound and potentially dangerous implications for the suc-
cessful continuation of European integration…” In a similar vein, it was claimed that the EU 
challenges more than two centuries of traditional legal theory on the unity, hierarchy, sys-
tematic and internally consistent structure of law which derives its legitimacy and its origin 
from the state, whose will has even been personalised in the will of the demos represented 
in an unifi ed institutional structure of the government. See, for example, M Wind, ‘The Eu-
ropean Union as a polycentric polity: returning to a neo-medieval Europe?’ in JHH Weiler 
and M Wind (eds) (n 38). For very similar claims, but within the broader fi eld of classical 
legal pluralism, see H Petersen and H Zahle, Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism 
in Law (Aldershot, Darmouth 1995).
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of modern society41 due to some of its intrinsic qualities42 that emanate 
from its dual nature.
Speaking about the dual nature of law, we refer to the formal and 
substantive dimensions of its existence. This is a very well-known is-
sue that has historically divided lawyers, roughly speaking, between the 
proponents of positive law, i.e. legal positivists that have focused on and 
promoted the formal conception of law, and the proponents of natural 
law in various forms who have emphasised the substantive conception 
of law.43 As the following discussion will show, the two accounts of law - 
formal and substantive - cannot be taken separately or even antagonisti-
cally. Rather, they have to be fused in the so-called integrated conception 
of law.
From the purely formal understanding of law, the purpose of legal 
regulation in society is the maintenance of order based on legal rules 
that their addressees should be able to comprehend and according to 
which their actions should be guided. For the formal conception of law, it 
is thus indispensable that valid legal rules are promulgated in a correct 
manner by a competent body, that they are of prospect temporal validity 
and that they are clear and identifi able so that the addressees of these 
legal rules which confer rights and impose duties know how to conduct 
themselves in order to remain in compliance with the law. Non-compli-
ance with legal rules is, according to the formal conception of law, the 
only justifi ed reason for sanctions (coercion) imposed on the individual. 
Sanctions can be imposed only by independent courts to which every-
body must have equal access. In essence, the formal conception of law is 
about certainty: individuals have to know who adopts the law, what their 
rights and duties are according to the law, and who adjudicates the cases 
of confl ict and non-compliance.44
The advocates of the substantive conception of law recognise the 
importance of certainty, which legal positivists posit as the paramount 
41 Some would push this claim even further by contending that law is actually the only 
remaining integrative force of modern societies once all the metaphysical integrative forces 
are lost. See, most notably, J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (MIT Press, Cambridge 
1996). Habermas claims that within complex societies the only remaining tool of social inte-
gration is communicative action exercised through the means of law which, with its specifi c 
dual nature of coercion (ensuring effectiveness) and legitimacy (rational acceptance of law), 
brings security (positive law is effective and presumed to be valid) and leaves the people 
free as to their motives for compliance with the law. Law thus guarantees both security and 
freedom, and this is what holds modern societies together. 
42 Above all, law’s capacity to contain and channel confl icts, which is also a source of the 
authority of law. See, D Chalmers, ‘Deliberative Supranationalism and the Reteritorrializa-
tion of Authority’ (comment in EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2005/12). 
43 In what follows we draw heavily on P Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the 
Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ (1997) Public Law 467.
44 Ibid 469, citing J Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 LQR. 195. 
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value, but they go further in their quest by raising the question of good 
and bad law. For legal formalists, this question pertains to theories of 
social and political justice, which are, of course, not unimportant, but 
which are methodologically unnecessary and even inappropriate for the 
formal conception of law and should therefore be excluded from its am-
bit.45 On the other hand, the appropriate theory of justice embedded in 
law constitutes the core of the substantive conception of law. The sub-
stantive conception of law is therefore not just about certainty, but about 
the certainty in the allocation of rights and duties between individuals 
and the public authority that fi ts best the chosen conception of justice of 
a particular community.46 
Neither of the two conceptions of law can stand in isolation from 
the other. An exclusively formalist approach without substantive jus-
tice would soon turn certainty into oppression, whereas an exclusively 
substantive approach without formal means to contain and check the 
claims to an appropriate conception of justice would sooner or later turn 
justice into injustice and arbitrariness. Since to be valid law has to be 
effective (certainty and coercion) and legitimate (justice), the only viable 
conception of law is an integrated conception that merges the formal and 
the substantive. According to the latter, the role of the law is to provide 
certainty in the allocation of rights and duties that fi ts best the chosen 
conception of justice within the respective community. 
V. Integrated Conception of Law in a Pluralist European Context: 
Towards a Coherent or Uniform Legal Order? 
The integrated conception of law faces great obstacles, in terms of 
the pluralist nature of the European Union, on its way to the success-
ful role that it is expected to play. First of all, certainty by default seems 
to be undermined by the plurality of the competing plausible claims to 
ultimate legal authority. Secondly, the allocation of rights and duties in 
accordance with the conception of justice appropriate for a certain com-
munity faces an even bigger obstacle. It is not just that in the European 
Union we cannot speak of the traditional self-contained communities,47 
45 Ibid. This “purifi cation” of law has, of course, been most famously pursued by H Kelsen 
in Max Knight (tr), H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Gloucester, Mass. 1989).
46 Ibid 477 citing R Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986).
47 We can distinguish between two types of communities: self-contained and open com-
munities. A self-contained community is one which is autarchic, self-suffi cient, with its 
own primary and secondary rules which are effi cient. The relationship to the other self-
contained communities is one of co-existence, as opposed to co-operation, and contacts 
between these communities are regulated by legal rules stipulated by them on a consen-
sual basis (read international law). Self-contained communities regard themselves, and are 
regarded by others, as sovereign, i.e. they can decide on their own and by themselves on 
the law and the conception of justice that will govern the relationships between the actors 
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which were the starting points of the classical works of legal and political 
philosophy,48 it is simply impossible to speak of the European Union, at 
least at fi rst sight, as a single community. The EU is a multilayered poli-
ty, constituted by twenty-fi ve different communities, which are internally 
differentiated, and by a supranational level which claims its own autono-
mous existence. Instead of one self-contained community, we thus have 
twenty-fi ve open communities plus an overarching supranational one. 
What follows from this is the main and utterly complex question of what 
kind of conception of justice could plausibly be adopted on the suprana-
tional level that would not confl ict with the conceptions of justice of the 
twenty-fi ve national communities. 
Ultimately, it turns out that it is precisely this question that lies 
behind European legal pluralism and behind all the (constitutional) con-
fl icts between the supranational and national legal orders. Constitutional 
confl icts in the European Union are therefore not just about which formal 
legal rule, EU or national, prevails over another legal rule. This would 
be the case if we stuck only to the formalist conception of law, but this, 
as we have seen, is not possible. If it was all just about competing rules 
without any substance, we could merely construct a system of confl ict 
of laws which would lead fi rst to one, and then to another rule, and cer-
tainty in the practical results would be achieved. But legal rules are also 
about substance, in which the conception of justice adopted in a certain 
legally-regulated community is mirrored, and the choice between differ-
ent rules therefore entails strong policy considerations,49 and this cannot 
be done mechanically. The confl icts between national and supranational 
legal orders in the European Union - and hence the essence of EU legal 
pluralism - are thus essentially a matter of the most appropriate concep-
tion of justice on which the allocation of rights and duties of individuals 
and the overall just institutional structure of the Union should be built.
Having realised that and assuming that we are not wrong, where do 
we go from here? How to deal with these fundamental and hard ques-
tions instigated by EU legal pluralism in its various forms and degrees 
in the community. A typical example of a self-contained community is the national state of 
the post-Westphalian world. However, as we have seen above, this kind of state has been 
brought to an end by the European Union, and similar processes are taking place through-
out the world on account of the so-called process of globalisation. Self-contained communi-
ties nowadays thus do not exist anymore, certainly not in the European Union.
48 See, for example, J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (OUP, Oxford 1972): “I shall be satisfi ed if 
it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society 
conceived […] as a closed system isolated from other societies.” Much the same can be said 
for most of Dworkin’s works which are limited to the confi nes of the American or, at best, 
also to English society.
49 See C Joerges, ‘Rethinking European Law’s Supremacy’ (EUI Working Paper LAW No. 
2005/12, 9) for, inter alia, the evolution of the fi eld of confl icts of laws from the “purely pri-
vate law matter” to the politicisation and realisation of its general social signifi cance.
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in order to ensure certainty in the allocation of rights and duties among 
the individuals that fi ts best the appropriate conception of justice in the 
European Union as well? As we have seen, there are roughly two different 
ways of answering this question: either by preserving EU legal pluralism, 
or by thwarting it. Namely, by conceptualising and developing the EU 
legal order, either as a coherent or as a uniform legal order. In the former 
model, the EU legal order should function as a pluralist harmonious con-
nection of several national legal orders which co-exist and co-operate 
without destroying or contradicting each other and the whole. In the lat-
ter model, the EU legal order would be constituted as a unity - as a legal 
order which is complete or entire in itself and, as such, allows only for a 
limited degree of diversity. 
It is apparent that each of these two models presupposes a different 
picture of the European Union and that the core issues of the EU legal 
order50 fi gure very differently depending on whether the EU is conceived 
as a coherent or as a uniform legal order. The choice between these two 
models is in our view contingent on which of them better fi ts into the 
current EU reality (capacity of description), which of them can provide 
better tools for its understanding (epistemological or explanatory capac-
ity), and which can better fi t the requirements posed by the integrated 
conception of law (normative capacity). The fi nal decision, however, can-
not depend just on legal considerations, since we have to be aware of the 
limited capacity of law in shaping society. Especially in the supranational 
context,51 we also have to exercise extreme care not to succumb to legal 
fetishism.52 Many other factors, above all political and economic, play an 
important role in society, and they have to be taken into account. This 
contextualised approach is after all demanded by the endorsed integrat-
ed conception of law and is at the same time intrinsic to the European 
Union. By focusing just on the legal and institutional aspects, above all 
on the role of the judiciary, as has been done too often so far, we risk 
neglecting many processes that play an equally important role in the life 
of the Union and which cannot be overlooked by any of the competing 
models of EU legal order.53 
50 Hereby we have in mind especially the fundamental principles of EU law (supremacy, di-
rect effect), standards of human rights protection, types of differentiated integration, overall 
constitutional image of the EU, etc.
51 Joerges (n 49) claims that in the supranational context “the wisdom and power of law 
are limited” and continues that “in terms of confl ict resolution the law should encourage the 
concerned actors themselves to take up the search for problem-solving interest-mediation. It 
should ensure that their activities respect principles of fairness, enhance their deliberative 
quality and then eventually acknowledge such societal norm generation.”
52 Hereby we paraphrase N Walker’s constitutional fetishism. See Walker (n 23) 319.
53 One of such phenomena, which cannot be overlooked, is the phenomenon of new gover-
nance.
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